Conquistadors and anthropologists
The Polish philosopher Leszek
Kołakowski once wrote with apparent sympathy of a group of people who believed
fervently in their own ideals and disdained those of others, saying:
A few years ago I visited the pre-Columbian monuments in
Mexico and was lucky enough, while there, to find myself in the company of a
well known Mexican writer, thoroughly versed in the history of the Indian
peoples of the region. Often in the
course of explaining to me the significance of many things I would not have
understood without him, he stressed the barbarity of the Spanish soldiers who
had ground the Aztec statues into dust and melted down the exquisite gold
figurines to strike with the image of the Emperor. I said to him, ‘you think these people were
barbarians; but were they not, perhaps, true Europeans, indeed the last true
Europeans? They took their Christian and Latin civilization seriously; and it
is because they took it seriously that they saw no reason to safeguard pagan
idols; or to bring the curiosity and aesthetic detachment of archeologists into
their consideration of things imbued with a different, and therefore hostile
religious significance. If we are outraged at their behavior it is because we
are indifferent, both to their civilization, and to our own.’
Kołakowski
was, however, playing devil’s advocate—since, for him, the better angels of
European civilization were not the conquistadors, but the anthropologists. “The anthropologist,” Kołakowski writes,
must suspend his own norms, his judgments, his mental,
moral, and aesthetic habits in order to penetrate as far as possible into the
viewpoint of another and assimilate his way of perceiving the world. And even though no one, perhaps, would claim
to have achieved total success in this effort, even though total success would
presuppose an epistemological impossibility—to enter entirely into the mind of
the object of inquiry while maintaining the distance and objectivity of the
scientist—the effort is not in vain. We
cannot completely achieve the position of an observer seeing himself from the
outside, but we may do so partially.
Like the
scholar C after he heard my irritating paper at the conference years ago, when
confronted with that which is alien to our sensibilities we may make the
attempt to stand outside ourselves, and in doing so see something other than an
object of disdain. Indeed, we may get a
kind of doubled or even tripled vision: we’ll know the thing we’re looking at—a
poem, say—on something like it’s own terms, as well as on ours. Moreover, we might discover something about
our own assumptions—our assumptions and, one hopes, ourselves.
*
There's more. The essay is in Copper Nickel 21, Fall 2015. A modified version will also appear as the afterword to my book The Kafka Sutra.
*
UPDATE: The article is now available online here.
*
UPDATE: The article is now available online here.
Cover by Mark Mothersbaugh. You know, from Devo. |